For the sake of argument, let’s take for granted your statement, that ‘suffering should be reduced as much as possible’.
If the discomfort of a single crab can prevent worse discomfort/suffering/death of many other beings, and results in reduced net pain, then the utilitarian line of reasoning seems to be that we might actually be morally obligated to take blood from crabs.
Sure, but the question was why humans in the first place have trouble with seeing suffering. And the reason is that we naturally seem to have a tendency of making moral judgements in the favour of being against suffering.
It’s often not easy to decide which decision leads to the best outcome. And people have a tendency to react more to what they are seeing now than to judge the bigger picture.
So, while the outcome may be the same (whether you believe the pain of animals doesn’t matter or that you accept there isn’t a better solution at the moment) the way people react is influenced by their moral compass.
I don’t understand the point you’re trying to make above.
In this case specifically, the outcome isn’t unclear. Let’s call the crab’s pain one unit of pain. Assume that unit can directly alleviate 20 units of pain across a handful of other beings. The utilitarian ought to prefer avoiding 19 units of net pain, than allowing 19 units of net pain to occur.
I read your initial post to be some sort of utilitarian moral argument, roughly, that less pain is better. Or something like that. That argument, in this case in particular, leads in the opposite direction than I think you want.
For the sake of argument, let’s take for granted your statement, that ‘suffering should be reduced as much as possible’.
If the discomfort of a single crab can prevent worse discomfort/suffering/death of many other beings, and results in reduced net pain, then the utilitarian line of reasoning seems to be that we might actually be morally obligated to take blood from crabs.
Sure, but the question was why humans in the first place have trouble with seeing suffering. And the reason is that we naturally seem to have a tendency of making moral judgements in the favour of being against suffering.
It’s often not easy to decide which decision leads to the best outcome. And people have a tendency to react more to what they are seeing now than to judge the bigger picture.
So, while the outcome may be the same (whether you believe the pain of animals doesn’t matter or that you accept there isn’t a better solution at the moment) the way people react is influenced by their moral compass.
I don’t understand the point you’re trying to make above.
In this case specifically, the outcome isn’t unclear. Let’s call the crab’s pain one unit of pain. Assume that unit can directly alleviate 20 units of pain across a handful of other beings. The utilitarian ought to prefer avoiding 19 units of net pain, than allowing 19 units of net pain to occur.
I read your initial post to be some sort of utilitarian moral argument, roughly, that less pain is better. Or something like that. That argument, in this case in particular, leads in the opposite direction than I think you want.